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The purpose of the research project outlined in the following is to establish a link between new 
international trade-related regulation (especially the GATS and the TRIPS agreements under the WTO) 
and underlying techno-economic changes in production organisation spawned especially by 
microelectronics and ICTs. 
 The project is based on the observation that technological development, deregulation/liberalisation 
and what is commonly referred to as (economic) ‘globalisation’ has progressed to a stage where broader 
society-wide institutional transformations are becoming both necessary and feasible: the further 
development of the emerging ‘information economy’ necessitates new forms of international regulation 
in order to enable and facilitate new modes of production organisation, in both institutional (network 
organisational forms) and geographical terms (increased internationalisation and changing divisions of 
labour). 
 These processes could be captured in a metaphor of ‘societal reengineering’, akin to ‘business 
process reengineering’ at the firm level: spurred especially by the diffusion of ICTs, from the early 
1990s onwards the ‘business process reengineering movement’ lead to radical restructuring of 
companies’ internal and external operations, often leading to significant productivity gains. In mature 
capitalist economic systems with elaborate division of labour, progressed capital accumulation, 
regulatory co-ordination, formalisation of separate societal spheres, and other features of late 
modernity, institutional restructuring processes similar to business process reengineering (BPR) have 
become feasible at a broader societal level.2 
 The extensive and socially delicate BPR projects were usually carried out by external consultants. 
Similarly is global ‘societal reengineering’ under the relatively autonomous (in the Gramscian sense) and 
external stewardship of the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO along a course influenced by 
organisations such as the G8, the OECD, and the WEF.  
                                                 
1 Paper prepared for The First Globelics Conference, ‘Innovation Systems and Development Strategies for the Third 
Millennium’, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2-6 November 2003. This is a suggestive outline of some of the observations, 
assumptions and preliminary analyses underlying a recently initiated research project. 
2 One likely indicator is the proliferation of public-private partnerships; global compacts; ICT task forces, etc. 
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 An interpretation along these lines is compatible with the view by prominent long wave theorists 
that the assertion of a new techno-economic paradigm will, with a lag, be accompanied by broader 
socio-cultural and institutional transformations.3 Carlotta Perez (2002, 1983) for instance argues that 
not only will such transformations follow, they are a requirement for the productivity potential of a new 
paradigm to be unleashed.4 If we are indeed observing such a process of ‘societal reengineering’ and if it 
is successful, the predicate ‘postmodern’ (and ‘post-Fordist’) will take on a substantial meaning.5 
 While not having to necessarily adopt a ‘full’ long wave interpretation, the project will explore how 
changes in techno-economic subsystems are interrelated with changes in both international (trade) 
regulation and in the institutional configurations of national innovation systems, especially in terms of 
government-business relationships and economic governance more generally. 
 Several of the new international regulatory efforts occur under the auspices of the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Being administered by the WTO, they are nominally concerned with ‘trade’. 
However, whereas trade regulation used to be concerned with border issues only, new trade regulations 
are characterised by also stipulating requirements to and reforms of hitherto domestic regulation.  
 Consequently this has obvious implications for the debate concerning the relative stability and 
volatility of national institutional systems. It also has important bearing on debates about how most 
such national systems change: a tempting hypotheses would be that, with parallels to Kuhn’s concept of 
paradigms and scientific revolutions, that in periods of relatively stable growth and development, 
national institutional systems evolve predominantly through endogenous processes, but in a period of 
major techno-economic transformations, the primary stimuli for change of national innovation systems 
are exogenous. 
  Even though many of the transformations we are alluding to predominantly take place within 
conventional statistical categories such as individual firms, internalised international production 
networks, industries and nations and are therefore not appropriately reflected in available statistics, the 
paper will make a first and very cursory quantitative assessment of some of these trends by looking at 
the development and internationalisation of ‘services’ as it is reflected in available statistics. 
 
Transformations in Industrial Organisation 
Which trends at the level of production are associated with the new international regulatory efforts? 
The proposition here is that an important trend in production organisation, which triggers a need for 
revised international regulation, is the one towards modularisation (Sturgeon 2002, 2003; Langlois 2002).  
 ‘Globalisation sceptics’ argue (a) that globalisation is not anywhere near as dramatic as some make it 
out to be and (b) that it is not a new phenomenon – that earlier periods have shown the same or even 
greater extent of ‘globalisation’.6 Of course a dismissal of the occurrence of ‘globalisation processes’ 
does not follow logically from the fact that comparable processes have occurred before in history. It 
can only logically require the minor rhetorically adjustment of speaking of ‘a globalisation period’ rather 
than ‘the globalisation period’. 
 Looking at a range of contemporary and historical aggregate statistics, there has been and still is 
good reason to question the extent of globalisation. But, recalling Schumpeter’s observation that 
                                                 
3 Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982) attempt to specifically address the implications of growth cycles on the organisation 
of the world system into cores and peripheries. 
4 Without authoritative action such a transformative period would be likely to become at least as disruptive as the last 
one: Polanyi (1957) of course brilliantly accounts for the ferocity of the last ‘Great Transformation’; for accounts 
from the arts, revisit e.g. Dickens’ novels and Fritz Lang’s ‘Metropolis’. 
5 This '-ism' could perhaps be dubbed 'Ciscoism' after the leading contemporary organisational innovator Cisco 
Systems, which as the provider of the majority of Internet backbone hardware is a 'paradigmatic' company today as 
Ford Motor Company was in the early 20th century. Other fanciful labels could be 'Walmartism' after one of the first 
pioneers in BPR, or even '2nd Generation Fordism' since Ford Motor Company along with other major automobile 
manufacturers eventually also implemented radical BPR projects. 
6 This would refer to the ‘academic’ sceptics. Another sceptic position is the one focussing on the potentially negative 
aspects of globalisation in terms of ecology, distribution, social cohesion, etc. 
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aggregate statistics hides as much as it reveals, this may equally much be related to the inadequacy of 
the conventional statistics for measuring the particular types for transformations occurring under the 
label of ‘globalisation’. 
 So rather than either or, it is a matter of both: contemporary transformations, especially network 
organisational forms, place stress on and challenge established statistics, concepts, vocabularies and 
even theories. Recognising this, the paradox is resolved – both the globalisation enthusiasts and the 
globalisation sceptics are right: much remains the same, only in does so in ‘a new way’. 
 During the 1990s, technological development, especially in ICT, biotech, new materials and 
transport, interacted with regulatory efforts towards liberalisation and deregulation of international 
trade, investment and finance to produce an (almost) unprecedented scale and speed of change in the 
structure and composition of economic activities. 
 A growing formalisation and taylorisation of production chains, increasingly held together by 
underlying ICT-networks, has allowed for discrete production steps to be delineated and eventually 
physically moved out of the ‘lead’ enterprises, as evident in the surge of business process reengineering, 
outsourcing, and internationally dispersed production networks.  
 Partly as a consequence of these trends, leading companies today compete less on cost-cutting and 
routine manufacturing and more on activities lying ‘before’, ‘after’, and ‘across’ manufacturing itself, 
such as R&D and innovation; marketing, branding, and producer-customer relationships; and new 
organisational and managerial techniques. These latter and in competitive terms critical activities are 
typically those associated with the highest value-added, those with the highest barriers to entry, and 
those which are retained in the home country when companies internationalise. Accordingly, citizens in 
the countries in the North gradually find themselves inhabiting an “information”, “knowledge” or 
“learning” society. 
 Along with better and cheaper communication and transportation systems (including ICTs), the 
trend towards deregulation/liberalisation, the end of the Cold War, stagnation of growth in developed 
countries, and abundant cheap labour, modularisation is a major factor underpinning accelerated 
economic globalisation. Increased modularisation of production allows for two things: disintegration of 
services and increased geographical dispersion of production.  
 Sturgeon (2002) outlines what he sees as an emergent American model of industrial organisation, 
the modular production network. Lead firms in the modular production network concentrate on the 
creation, penetration and defence of markets for end products, and increasingly the provision of 
services to go with them, while manufacturing capacity is shifted out-of-house to globally operating 
turn-key suppliers. The modular production network relies on codified inter-firm links and the generic 
manufacturing capacity residing in turn-key suppliers to reduce transaction costs, build large external 
economies of scale and reduce risk for network actors. According to Sturgeon, the emergence of the 
modular production network is part of a historical process of industrial transformation in which 
nationally specific models of industrial organisation co-evolve in intensifying rounds of competition, 
diffusion and adaptation. 
 Among the many interesting aspects of the modular production networks discussed by Sturgeon are 
the requirements they introduce to modify Schumpeter’s theory of innovation (Sturgeon 2002): first of 
all, according to Schumpeter successful innovator firms would get larger over time due to higher 
profits, which would in turn allow for aggressive capital investment, which would become barriers to 
entry for new firms and market structure would become more concentrated over time. However, with 
modular production networks where manufacturing resides with dedicated supply-manufacturers, 
changes in market share can be organisationally delinked from increases in firm-specific capital 
investment and as a result barriers to entry based on the holding of productive capacity by leading firms 
do not necessarily develop. Second, Schumpeter believed that oligopolistic market structures would 
inevitably be destroyed in ongoing rounds of innovation, competition and new market creation. 
However, modular production networks make it possible for market shares to change hands without 
idling or destruction of productive capital and there modifies the ‘destructive’ aspect of Schumpeter‘s 
conception of ‘creative destruction’: with modular production networks, successful innovation does not 
necessarily lead to giant corporations. 
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 The disintegration of services, and outsourcing more generally, introduces a need for stronger 
intellectual property systems to protect the knowledge and information which could previously be kept 
internal and proprietary but now has to be communicated between the interfaces of individual 
companies across a public domain space. This points more generally to the transaction cost theory of 
intellectual property systems (as opposed to the more straightforward ‘incentive theory’). 
 The parcelling out of distinct and better-delineated production activities with well-defined interfaces 
to other activities in the total value chain enables geographically dispersed modes of production, subject 
to the availability of a number of the pull-factors we enumerated above as general factors underlying 
economic globalisation. Specifically, it appears to be a necessary condition that the costs of 
transmissions between production sites (of both materials and knowledge/information) are reduced to 
below a critical threshold (Nordås 2003). This prerequisite is increasingly attained with new global trade 
regulation. 
 From this brief account it is tempting to establish a direct correspondence between disintegration of 
services and geographical dispersion of services, or functional and geographical outsourcing more 
generally, on the one hand and the advent of the TRIPS and GATS agreements under the WTO (see 
the later section on regulations) respectively on the other. Furthermore, an increasing need to 
communicate across firms’ boundaries and at geographical distance can be associated with a 
corresponding need for more elaborate and more widely adopted technical standards. 
 
From Production to Regulation 
Several different but related institutional approaches suggest persuasive ways to establish the link 
between changes in the organisation of production and regulatory reforms.  
 Andrew Tylecote’s (1992) analyses the broader political economy of the growth of the world 
economy over the past two centuries and portrays a series of successive ‘technological styles’ together 
with a variety of feedback mechanisms (monetary, demographic, polarisation). Borrowing Carlotta 
Perez’ terminology (see below) the analysis distinguishes between the ‘techno-economic subsystem’ 
(TES) and the ‘socio-institutional framework’ (SIF). Tylecote argues that the Fordist TES (assembly 
line methods, taylorist work organisation, structure of corporate governance, mass markets) were well 
in place in the first quarter of the 20th century but was at the time not accompanied by an appropriate 
SIF, with underconsumption and eventually the Great Depression as results. Specific changes in the 
SIF during the 1940s and 1950s led to sufficient accordance between the TES and the SIF to realise a 
long wave upswing: (1) international integration via Pax Americana; (2) political integration with 
increased influence of the working class at the government level; (3) economic integration with power 
balances between industry and finance and between labour and capital; and (4) a measure of social 
integration through stability within the family. Eventually though, a new downswing emerged in the 
1970s when the potential of the Fordism was exhausted and a new TES evolved, viz. that of 
microelectronics and biotechnology. The proposition then is that a new economic upswing will not be 
released until a symbiotic relationship is established between the technological/organisation (TES) and 
new appropriate social/political institutions (SIF). 
 Tylecote draws on an older and similar analysis by Carlotta Perez (1983), which she has later 
expanded to also incorporate more recent economic developments (Perez 1997, 2002) including the 
burst of the dot-com bubble. Perez follows long wave theory in asserting that technological 
development is discontinuous and about every 50 years a new ‘technological style’ or ‘paradigm for the 
most efficient organisation of production’ arises. Through a process driven by the drastic cheapening of 
a set of key factors of production due to radical innovations the new style causes rapid changes in the 
‘techno-economic subsystem’. Capitalist economies are seen as consisting of two subsystems: the 
techno-economic and a ‘socio-institutional framework’. The two subsystems combined are referred to 
as a ‘mode of development’, ‘[…] understood as a general pattern of growth, based on a set of accepted 
social and institutional mechanisms, national and international, influencing the operation and evolution 
of factor and other markets’ (Perez 1983: 358). If there is a mismatch between the two subsystems 
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diffusion of a new technological style is blocked, causing a downswing and a crisis. The crisis in turn 
spawns reforms of the ‘framework’ so that the two subsystems are brought back into accordance, and 
fast diffusion of the new style and an upswing follows.  
 Perez in turn draws on the work of the Régulation School (Boyer 1990; Boyer and Saillard 1995). 
The Régulation School (RS) is concerned with the socially embedded, socially regularised nature of 
capitalist economies rather than with pure, self-regulating market phenomena and seeks to incorporate 
broader politico-economic issues to show how they interact to ‘normalise’ the capital relation (Jessop 
2001). Market forces are regarded as only one of several contributing factors to capitalist expansion; the 
capitalist economy in its integral sense includes both economic and extra-economic factors. The extra-
economic factors include institutions, collective identities, shared visions, common rules, norms, and 
conventions, networks, procedures, and modes of calculation. All of these have important roles in 
guiding or ‘regularizing’ the process of capital accumulation and in combining production and 
consumption in a virtuous circle of accumulation in what is otherwise seen as an improbable system of 
capitalist reproduction. The social and economic patterns that enable accumulation to occur in the long 
term between two structural crises are referred to as a ‘regime of accumulation’. The specific 
configurations of social relations for any given era or geographical location, which socialise the 
heterogeneous behaviour of economic agents, are referred to as a ‘mode of régulation’. Finally, the 
conjunction of an accumulation regime and a type of régulation is referred to as a ‘mode of development’ 
(cf. Perez). 
 
Services as a Temporary Proxy 
Towards which quantitative indicators should we look to gauge these trends? Unfortunately, the 
available indicators tend not to serve us very well for two primary reasons: First there is the general and 
unfortunate tendency that the most economically interesting phenomena occur as residuals in 
mainstream economics and are therefore not appropriately covered by indicators. This applies for 
instance to ‘technical change’ (a residual in Solow’s growth model after labour and capital are accounted 
for) and to ‘services’ (a residual in the Fisher-Clark model of economic development (Tomlinson and 
Ndhlovu 2003)). This is of course a paradox given Solow’s own estimate that 80 per cent of U.S. 
growth 1909-49 had to be attributed to residual ‘technical change’ (Solow 1957), and given that two 
thirds of the world economy today is made up of services.7 
 Second globalisation, deregulation, and new managerial and organisational techniques (network 
organisational form) have come to place discernible stress on established indicators, concepts and even 
theories. Among the primary heretofore central concepts, which are becoming less applicable or 
changing their nature are ‘nation’, ‘firm’, ‘trade’, and the service vs. good-distinction – and of course 
these concepts are at the core of traditional statistical compilations. This introduces a distinct and 
perhaps temporarily increased need for qualitative analyses as well as for a reconsideration of existing 
systems of statistics. 
 In terms of available indicators we would expect the trends we are focussing on to inter alia be 
reflected in an increasing content of knowledge and information intensive activities and a changing 
structural composition of K&I-intensive activities vis-à-vis other activities and possibly also a changing 
geographical distribution of such activities. Accordingly we can make a first rough survey of some of 
these trends by looking at developments in the statistical category of ‘services’.8  
                                                 
7 These issues are of course the subjects of extensive literatures. Especially the work on endogenous growth 
(Abramowitz, Grossman and Helpman, Romer, Lucas) is a pertinent improvement of growth modelling; and Miozzo 
and Soete (2001) suggest a more refined accounting method for services (not unlike Pavitt’s (1984) refinement of 
the classification of industries). But our issue here is not to discuss growth modelling or national accounting, rather 
the intention is to make a first attempt at identifying usable indicators and then apply them for a first rough 
estimation of the issues of interest. 
8 The statistical category of services include activities such as transport telecommunications, insurance, other financial 
services, real estate, business services, wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and construction. 
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 More specifically, we can put forth a set of hypotheses: (1) we generally expect the transformations 
of production referred to to be reflected in a changing role of ‘services’ in production and patterns of 
trade and investment;  (2) we would expect increasing internationalisation of services due to the push 
and pull factors referred to earlier fuelling ‘economic globalisation’. Further, (3) we would expect the 
surge in internationalisation of manufacturing to have led to an increasing need for OECD countries to 
capitalise more on ‘services’, in turn translating into (a) an increasing trade surplus in services (to 
compensate for deficit in manufacturing) and (b) increasing income from royalties and fees from 
patents and licenses. Finally, (4) research shows that there are persistent close and important linkages 
between service and manufacturing activities and between ‘old’ and ‘new’ industries. The extreme 
hypothetical scenario were manufacturing and services were completely separated geographically is thus 
not immediately viable. For this reason, we would expect the surge of FDI in manufacturing to be 
accompanied by increasing FDI in services.9 
Extent of Service Activities 
Services are the fastest growing sector of the global economy and account for two thirds of output, a 
third of global employment and 20 per cent of global trade. 
 As a very first indication we can look at the shares of value-added and employment of services 
globally: Over the period 1971 to 2000 the content of services in world output has increased from 50.6 
per cent to 66.1 per cent (see Figure 1). From 1990 to 1996 world employment in services increased 
from 29 per cent of total employment to 37 per cent, primarily at the expense of agriculture (see Table 
1). 
 
Figure 1  World value-added by sector, 1971-2000 (current US$, value and per cent) 
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Source: Data from World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
 
Table 1  World employment by sector, 1990-1996 (% of total employment) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Services  29.3 30.7 31.4 32.4 31.5 34.0 36.8
Industry 20.9 21.9 21.6 22.0 21.5 21.4 22.9
Agriculture  43.2 40.9 40.7 39.4 40.5 38.5 ..
Total 93.4 93.6 93.6 93.8 93.6 93.9 ..
Source: Data from World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
Generally, the higher the GDP, the higher the share of services in the economy: 
 
                                                 
9 When service indicators are used to assess real economic trends one should also be aware that the increasing statistical 
visibility of services also has to do with increasing outsourcing of services, which makes service activities 
previously ‘hidden’ within firms turn up in national statistics. There may also be changes in the operationalisation of 
statistical concepts over time (affects time series from World Development Indicators) and various more extensive 
revisions of service classification systems are currently ongoing. 
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Figure 2  Share of services in total value added by GDP per capita, 2001. 
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Source: Calculation based on data from World Development Indicators. 
 
But as already mentioned, ‘services’ is an extremely diverse category ranging from petty trade to 
sophisticated financial intermediation services. Further, the extent and character of service activities 
varies over time and between regions and countries. 
 Available data does allow us to dig a little deeper by breaking value-added in services down by 
countries and country groups, cf. Table 2. 
 
Table 2  Value added 2001 in countries and country groups, by sector and gross (per cent and current 
US$ billion) 
 Agriculture Industry Services Total Gross value added 
  Total industry Of which 
manufacturing 
  US$ billion 
World* 4.0 30.0 20.1 66.1 100.0 29,272 
       
OECD* 1.9 28.4 19.6 69.7 100.0 22,868 
European Monetary Union 2.5 29.0 21.0 68.5 100.0 5,438 
       
Low & middle income 12.6 36.7 22.8 50.7 100.0 5,566 
 East Asia & Pacific 15.1 48.1 32.6 36.7 100.0 1,530 
 Europe & Central Asia 8.8 34.7 .. 56.5 100.0 876 
 Latin America & Caribbean 7.1 30.6 18.5 62.3 100.0 1,748 
 Middle East & North Africa .. .. .. ..  .. 
 South Asia 24.9 25.6 15.2 49.6 100.0 567 
 Sub-Saharan Africa 20.8 29.7 12.1 49.6 100.0 289 
       
LDCs 32.1 25.4 10.6 42.5 100.0 187 
       
United States* 1.6 24.9 17.2 73.5 100.0 9,119 
United Kingdom 1.0 27.4 .. 71.6 100.0 1,260 
Japan* 1.4 31.8 21.6 66.8 100.0 2,008 
China 15.2 51.1 35.4 33.6 100.0 1,044 
Hong Kong 0.1 13.4 5.2 86.5 100.0 156 
Indonesia 17.0 45.6 25.0 37.5 100.0 138 
Denmark 2.8 26.2 17.0 71.0 100.0 139 
* Year 2000 data. Gross value added 2001 estimated by adjusting value added 2000 with yearly GDP growth rate (World: 1.134; OECD: 
0.746; USA: 0.300; Japan: -0.579)  
Source: Data from World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
This data reveals large differences between the content of services in the economies of different 
countries and regions: in the industrialised countries, which might incidentally better be referred to as 
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the ‘servisalised’ countries, the content of services in the economy is generally around 70 per cent. At 
87 per cent, Hong Kong has the highest service content in the table, which is readily explained by its 
special status as a regional service hub. The U.S. has the second highest share of services at 73 per cent 
(year 2000). 
 Japan has retained a higher share of industrial activities than the OECD average in general and than 
the U.S. and U.K. in particular. The fact that East Asia has developed into the world’s industrial 
powerhouse is apparent from the fact that industry contributes as much as 48 per cent of total value 
added in the low and middle income countries in East Asia & Pacific. This is also reflected by two of 
the individual countries listed from this country group: China and Indonesia. In China especially, 
industry accounts for a large share of value added, viz. 51 per cent, well higher than the East Asia & 
Pacific average of 48 per cent. 
 The LDCs as a group, the low and middle income country groups, and China and Indonesia all 
have high shares of agriculture in total value added. With its high shares of agriculture and industry, 
China has a very low share of services in total value added – the lowest in the table. Compared to the 
low and middle income country average, Latin America & Caribbean has a relatively high share of 
services in value added at 62 per cent.  
 Next we look at the changes over time in the content of services in total value added. 
 
Table 3  Index of share of services in total value added, by countries and country groups, 1985-2002 
(1985=100) 
 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 2002
World 100.0 114.0 121.1 125.8 125.6 .. ..
    
OECD 100.0 102.8 107.5 111.5 111.7 .. ..
European Monetary Union 100.0 103.9 110.2 113.6 113.6 114.0 ..
    
Low & middle income 100.0 104.8 116.9 122.7 121.2 120.5 ..
East Asia & Pacific 100.0 109.2 108.7 107.0 106.5 107.3 108.7
Europe & Central Asia .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Latin America & Caribbean 100.0 116.3 126.9 139.0 137.3 134.8 ..
Middle East & North Africa .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
South Asia 100.0 102.7 108.9 116.3 117.7 119.7 123.8
Sub-Saharan Africa 100.0 106.7 115.0 116.6 114.1 113.4 111.3
    
LDCs* .. 100.0 100.0 97.1 96.3 98.0 ..
    
United States 100.0 104.9 108.0 110.1 110.1 .. ..
United Kingdom 100.0 107.7 113.2 120.2 120.2 122.6 ..
Japan 100.0 101.5 111.2 115.5 116.2 .. ..
China 100.0 109.9 107.6 115.5 116.6 117.9 119.2
Hong Kong 100.0 107.0 120.5 122.7 123.3 124.5 ..
Indonesia 100.0 101.3 100.3 90.4 89.5 91.5 93.0
Denmark 100.0 103.3 105.6 107.0 105.0 106.4 ..
* Base year 1990. 
Source: Calculations based on data from World Development Indicators, World Bank. 
 
The table shows that the share of services in total global value added has increased by 25.6 per cent 
from 1985 to 2000. With a few exceptions, the share of services has grown for all countries and country 
groups but at very different pace. One obvious reason for this is that the growth rate for countries, 
which already have high shares of services, will tend to be lower. 
 As a group, low and middle income countries have had a fast growth in the share of services in 
value added even though the group of LDCs actually have lower shares of services in total value added 
over time (as has Indonesia). Low and middle income countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
have had the highest growth in share of services in value added even though the share has been 
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receding over the period 1999-2001. In Sub-Saharan Africa the share of services grew until 1999 but 
has declined since. 
 Hong Kong has had the second highest growth in the table from what was already a high share in 
1985. The share of services in the Japanese economy has grown faster over the period than in the U.S. 
but remains at a significantly lower level as we saw in the preceding table. Even though we saw that 
China still has a very low share of services in total value added the share of services has grown steadily 
throughout the period and faster than the average of low and middle income countries in the region. 
Part of the reason for the low share of services in China is likely to be the particular division of labour 
in the region involving especially Hong Kong but also Taiwan. 
 
Internationalisation of services 
After having looked at the content of services in different economies and its development over time, 
we will next try to assess the extent and character of internationalisation of services, i.e. changes in the 
geography of production and delivery of services. We can do this by looking at two issues: trade in 
services and foreign direct investment in services respectively to the extent available statistics allows us.  
 
Trade in Services 
We can assess trends in trade in services by looking at net trade in services over time for different 
countries and regions. In addition to trade, another way to capitalise on knowledge and information 
intensive activities is by selling patents and licenses: increasing income from royalties and fees can also 
be considered an instance of ‘internationalisation of knowledge and information intensive activities’. 
Table 4 shows net trade in goods, net trade in services, and net receipt of royalties and fees as 
percentage of GDP for different time periods and countries/country groups. 
 In the OECD countries as a group there is a slightly increasing deficit in trade in goods and a slight 
and steady surplus in trade in services. There is a small and constant surplus in royalties and fees 
throughout the period. In the European Monetary Union there is a slightly increasing surplus in trade 
in goods and a slightly increasing deficit in trade in services. There is a deficit in royalties and fees 
throughout the period and the deficit appears to be increasing. 
 Thus, these observations do not immediately appear to confirm the hypotheses we put forward 
above, viz. that a need in OECD countries to capitalise more on services would translate into 
increasing trade surplus in services and increasing income and royalties and fees. 
 The table does however show some other clear and interesting trends: the surplus in trade in goods 
in East Asia & Pacific comes out very clearly and Middle East and North Africa too has a significant 
increase in goods trade. Both regions have a deficit in service trade; a deficit which is increasing in East 
Asia & Pacific but declining in Middle East and North Africa.  
 All low and middle income country groups have a deficit in royalties and fees and the deficit is 
increasing. This trend is only likely to be amplified as more tight international intellectual property 
systems are put into effect. 
 The U.S. has a considerable and increasing deficit in goods trade. Even though it has a surplus in 
both service trade and royalties and fees it not of a magnitude to compensate for the goods deficit. The 
U.K. shows a pattern similar to that of the U.S. 
 China has an increasing surplus in goods trade but an increasing deficit in both service trade and 
royalties and fees. Indonesia has the largest deficit in service trade among the countries and regions 
listed. The country’s very high surplus in goods trade is likely to be caused by the rising cost of imports 
due to currency depreciation and the contraction in GDP following the financial crisis and the lingering 
unrest. 
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Table 4  Net trade in goods and services and net receipt of royalties/fees by countries and regions, 1985-2001 (% of GDP) 
 Net trade in goods  Net trade in services  Net receipt of royalties and fees 
 1985-89 1990-99 1999 2001  1985-89 1990-99 1999 2001  1985-89 1990-99 1999 2001 
World 0.05% 0.19% 0.03% -0.13%  -0.08% 0.02% 0.08% 0.04%  0.01% 0.01% 0.00% -0.01% 
               
OECD -0.17% 0.21% -0.35% -0.78%  0.14% 0.19% 0.20% 0.17%  0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 
European Monetary Union 1.06% 1.29% 1.56% 1.77%  0.69% 0.19% -0.04% -0.09%  -0.11% -0.15% -0.21% -0.23% 
               
Low & middle income               
East Asia & Pacific -0.39% 2.20% 6.56% 5.15%  -0.44% -1.02% -1.19% -1.40%  -0.02% -0.07% -0.12% -0.21% 
Europe & Central Asia   -1.09% 1.31%    1.29% 0.94%   -0.03% -0.12% -0.13% 
Latin America & Caribbean 0.84% -0.29% -0.60% -0.43%  -0.20% -0.83% -0.88% -1.03%  -0.02% -0.08% -0.14% -0.13% 
Middle East & North Africa -1.48% 1.81% 2.60% 5.66%  -5.91% -4.27% -1.59% -0.78%  -0.01% -0.05% -0.08% -0.08% 
South Asia -3.96% -3.64% -4.19% -2.87%  0.08% 0.07% 0.61% 0.38%  -0.02% -0.03% -0.05% 0.00% 
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.06% 2.81% 2.16%   -2.82% -3.50% -3.25%   -0.06% -0.05% -0.06% -0.05% 
               
LDCs -3.86% -4.77% -4.42%   -2.07% -2.52% -1.88%   0.00% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 
               
United States -2.82% -2.36% -3.73% -4.21%  0.21% 0.92% 0.88% 0.66%  0.17% 0.28% 0.26% 0.22% 
United Kingdom -3.44% -2.16% -3.04% -3.38%  1.26% 1.14% 1.31% 1.14%  0.02% 0.05% 0.11% 0.15% 
Japan 3.48% 2.69% 2.74% 1.70%  -0.93% -1.18% -1.21% -1.06%   -0.07% -0.04% -0.02% 
China -2.30% 2.87% 3.63% 2.93%  0.39% -0.25% -0.54% -0.51%  0.00%  -0.07% -0.16% 
Hong Kong 0.33% -6.46% -1.97% -5.12%  9.41% 8.38% 7.63% 10.51%    -0.13%  
Indonesia 5.83% 5.94% 14.75% 16.07%  -4.12% -4.09% -4.98% -7.35%  0.00%    
Denmark 0.70% 3.89% 3.68% 4.20%  0.78% 1.12% 0.90% 2.12%  0.00% 0.00%   
Source: Calculations based on data from World Development Indicators Online. 
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FDI in Services 
Unfortunately, FDI statistics at a sectoral level is not readily available for all countries. Sectoral data is 
available for the OECD countries however and this at least allows us to assess FDI outflows from the 
OECD even though we cannot determine exactly where those flows are going. 
 What FDI inflows is concerned, in year 2001, global FDI inflows totalled US$725.2 billion dollars 
(see Table 5). 
 
Table 5  Inward FDI flows by industry, 2001 
  Developed countries Developing countries 
  US$ billions Per cent 
US$ 
billions Per cent 
Primary sector 55.9 10.2% 13.0 7.7%
Secondary sector 91.4 16.6% 56.0 33.0%
Tertiary sector 357.4 64.9% 99.1 58.4%
 Trade 27.1 4.9% 12.9 7.6%
 Transport, storage, communications 52.9 9.6% 20.1 11.8%
 Finance 111.0 20.2% 28.9 17.0%
 Business activities 113.8 20.7% 16.9 10.0%
Private buying and selling of property 0.5 0.1%  
Unspecified 45.3 8.2% 1.7 1.0%
Total 550.5 100.0% 169.8 100.0%
Source: World Investment Report 2003, UNCTAD. 
 
FDI outflows (a better indicator of structural transformations of the investing economy) in services have 
also been increasing fast, especially in the 2nd half of the 1990s, though they experienced a setback in 
2001. An increasing share of FDI outflows is within services. 
 
Table 6  FDI outflows by sector for selected OECD countries*, 1985-2001 (% of GDP and % of FDI 
outflows in all sectors) 
 1985 1990 1995 1999 2000 2001 
 % of GDP 
% of 
FDI 
outflows 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
FDI 
outflows 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
FDI 
outflows 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
FDI 
outflows 
% of 
GDP 
% of 
FDI 
outflows 
% of 
GDP 
% of FDI 
outflows 
Primary 
sector 0.05% 9.1% 0.07% 5.8% 0.04% 3.0% 0.10% 2.1% 0.24% 4.1% 0.20% 9.5% 
Industry 0.19% 34.6% 0.48% 39.7% 0.55% 41.4% 1.75% 37.2% 0.91% 15.6% 0.43% 20.4% 
Services 0.31% 56.4% 0.66% 54.6% 0.74% 55.6% 2.85% 60.6% 4.70% 80.3% 1.48% 70.1% 
Total 0.55% 100.0% 1.21% 100.0% 1.33% 100.0% 4.70% 100.0% 5.85% 100.0% 2.11% 100.00% 
* The countries included are the ten largest OECD economies plus the Scandinavian countries: Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Korea, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
** For the purposes of the simple calculation here, if FDI outflows is missing for a specific country, sector and year, FDI outflows/GDP 
for all countries for that sector and year is estimated as the share for the remaining countries. 
Source: Calculations based on data from SourceOECD. 
 
The statistics available from the OECD does allow for some further breakdown on FDI in different 
types of services but time has not allowed a review of this data here. 
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Table 7  FDI outflows in services and industry by country, 1985-2001 (% of GDP) 
  1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000 2001 
Canada Industry 0.09% 0.12% 0.20% .. .. 
 Services 0.51% 0.31% 2.13% 4.34% 3.21% 
Denmark  Industry 0.23% 0.57% 0.74% 0.68% 0.93% 
 Services 0.59% 0.89% 2.09% 14.27% 4.42% 
France  Industry 0.43% 0.51% 0.64% 1.37% 0.86% 
 Services 0.47% 0.64% 2.51% 11.67% 5.03% 
Germany Industry 0.37% 0.42% 1.28% 0.98% -0.04% 
 Services 0.27% 0.49% 1.48% 1.52% 2.28% 
Italy Industry 0.06% 0.13% 0.04% 0.32% 0.43% 
 Services 0.31% 0.41% 0.45% 0.60% 0.68% 
Japan  Industry 0.34% 0.33% 0.50% 0.25% 0.35% 
 Services 1.04% 0.75% 0.61% 0.77% 0.42% 
Korea Industry 0.08% 0.23% 0.37% 0.21% 0.32% 
 Services 0.03% 0.14% 0.29% 0.53% 0.10% 
Netherlands Industry 1.48% 1.87% 3.10% 6.12% 1.71% 
 Services 1.15% 2.12% 4.82% 12.67% 8.18% 
Norway Industry .. .. 0.59% .. -0.57% 
 Services .. .. 1.26% .. 2.05% 
Spain  Industry 0.06% 0.08% 0.91% 0.74% 0.99% 
 Services 0.25% 0.50% 1.83% 8.91% 3.44% 
Sweden  Industry .. 0.93% 2.02% 3.72% .. 
 Services .. 1.12% 1.45% 9.58% .. 
United Kingdom  Industry 1.81% 0.99% 2.19% 1.59% 0.90% 
 Services 1.36% 0.88% 3.39% 14.65% 0.92% 
United States Industry 0.20% 0.28% 0.38% .. 0.36% 
 Services 0.30% 0.46% 0.78% .. 0.99% 
Note: Period averages are calculated as the simple average of the individual years.  
Note: If more than two years are missing in a five-year period, ‘not available’ is reported in the table, otherwise the average of the 
remaining years is used. 
Source: Calculations based on data from World Development Indicators (GDP) and SourceOECD (FDI in local currency, exchange 
rates). 
 
In addition to looking at FDI outflows, we can also approach internationalisation from another angle 
by looking at trends in FDI inward stocks in services compared to manufacturing, see the table below. 
The table shows that services surpass manufacturing in global FDI inward stocks in 1999 and has also 
grown faster during 1988-99. Industrial countries have a significantly higher share of FDI inward stock 
in services than in manufacturing in 1999 but for developing countries the opposite is the case. 
However, and importantly, even though FDI inward stocks in industrial countries have grown faster in 
services than in manufacturing during 1988-99, FDI inward stocks in services have grown much faster 
in developing countries than they have in industrialised countries, as have FDI inward stocks in both 
sectors. 
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Table 8  FDI inwards stocks in services and manufacturing, 1988-99 (growth rate and shares in US$) 
 
Growth rate,  
1988-99 
(per cent change 
per year) 
Share, 1999 
(per cent) 
World   
 Total FDI 12.3  
 Manufacturing 12.2 41.6 
 Services 13.8 50.3 
   
Industrial countries   
 Total FDI 9.9  
 Manufacturing 9.1 36.4 
 Services 11.6 55.5 
   
Developing countries   
 Total FDI 21.5  
 Manufacturing 19.6 54.5 
 Services 28.2 37.3 
Note: Second column data for France are from 1998, and second column data for Japan are from 1994. 
Source: Global Economic Prospects 2003, World Bank, in turn based on World Investment Report 2001, UNCTAD. 
 
Which Regulation? 
If our initial characterisation of contemporary economic transformations is correct we would 
consequently expect to see the emergence of new and important pieces of regulation related to ICTs 
and to intellectual properties. A proper analysis pending this section will be confined to a brief outline 
of the primary pieces of new international regulation we are concerned with. In the research project 
from which this paper reports, these regulations will be analysed in the context of the case of the 
software industry. 
 GATS: The increasing “tradability” of services (trade in services grows much faster than trade in 
goods) has created a need for new multilateral regulation.  The GATS defines four ways in which a 
service can be traded, referred to as “modes of supply”. Mode 1 (“cross-border supply”) are services 
supplied from one country to another. Mode 2 (“consumption abroad”) covers consumers from one 
country making use of a service in another country. Mode 3 (“commercial presence”) refers to a 
company from one country setting up subsidiaries or branches to provide services in another country. 
Finally, mode 4 (“movement of natural persons”) is individuals travelling from their own country to 
supply services in another. These modes are dealt with in the GATS in two parts: the framework 
agreement containing the general rules and disciplines; and the national “schedules” which list 
individual countries’ specific commitments on access to their domestic markets by foreign suppliers. 
Members themselves choose in which service sectors or subsectors they will make commitments. The 
MFN is under the general rules and applies to all service sectors;10 the market access and national 
treatment rules apply only to the specific commitments and exceptions may be specified in the 
schedules. 
 TRIPS: The TRIPS agreement establishes an international intellectual property rights regime and 
requires member-states to amend their own laws in conformity with the agreement within a given time 
frame.11 It incorporates provisions from a number of separate treaties into a single framework and 
introduces new or higher obligations than these conventions.12 For the TRIPS, MFN and “national 
                                                 
10 However, it is recognized that MFN treatment may not be possible for every service activity and, therefore, it is 
envisaged that parties may indicate specific MFN exemptions. 
11 The TRIPS defines “intellectual property rights” as copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, patents, integrated circuit layout-designs and protection of undisclosed information (trade 
secrets). 
12 These agreements are the Paris Convention (on industrial property), the Berne Convention (on copyright),  the Treaty 
on Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits (IPIC Treaty), and the International Convention for the 
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (the Rome Convention). 
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treatment” applies from the date the agreement came into effect. Some scholars regard the agreement 
on TRIPS as the most serious concern for developing countries. It has been argued that the TRIPs 
agreement is likely to strengthen existing trade monopolies and adversely affect technology transfer to 
developing countries (May 2000; Dhar and Rao 1996). Others argue that the new patent regime will 
result in rising the costs of industrial development in technology importing countries, due to higher 
royalty payments to patent holders and increased prices of products manufactured under licence 
(UNCTAD 2001a; World Bank 2002).  TRIPs specifies that computer programmes are protected as 
literary works under the Berne Convention (copyright) and outlines how databases are protected. 
 TRIMs: The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) is not, as the name might 
lead one to think, an agreement governing international investment. TRIMS, which is one of the 
Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods (GATT), prohibits trade-related investment measures, such 
as local content requirements, that are inconsistent with basic provisions of GATT 1994. Investment in 
services is not governed by the TRIMS but by GATS Mode 3. Under the TRIMS, local content policies, 
trade balancing requirements, and quantitative import/export restrictions are not allowed; whereas 
TRIMS does not cover export incentives, export performance requirements, and technology transfer 
agreements.13 During the Uruguay Round negotiations, the United States in particular argued for 
prohibiting or restricting the use by member states of policies that in their view were biased against 
foreign investment such as local-content rules, export performance requirements, etc. It was argued 
that such measures restricted or distorted international trade. Many developing countries, on the other 
hand, saw such measures as essential elements of their industrial development strategies. They also 
regarded TRIMs as necessary for restraining transnational corporations from indulging in restrictive 
business practices (Dicken 1998). In Doha least-developed countries requested extension of the seven-
year transition period given to them under the TRIMS Agreement to eliminate inconsistent TRIMS. 
 Technical Barriers to Trade: The WTO agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement is 
an extension of a previous plurilateral GATT agreement, “the Standards Code”, which laid down the 
rules for preparation, adoption and application of technical regulations (mandatory), standards 
(voluntary) and conformity assessment procedures. The stated purpose is to ensure that technical 
negotiations and standards, as well as testing and certification procedures, do not create obstacles to 
trade. With respect to safeguard of human, animal and plant life and health, the agreement encourages 
countries to use international standards where these are appropriate, but it does not outright require 
them to change their levels of protection as a result of standardisation. 
 Information Technology Agreement: The Information Technology Agreement (ITA) was originally signed 
in 1997 by 29 countries or customs territories. It is a plurilateral trade agreement that requires 
participants to eliminate tariffs on a specific list of information technology (IT) products. These 
products include computer hardware and peripherals, telecommunications equipment, computer 
software (on media, including floppy and optical discs), semiconductor manufacturing equipment, 
analytical instruments, and semiconductors and other electronic components. The agreement covers 
approximately 95 per cent of world trade in defined information technology products, which is 
currently estimated to exceed US$1 trillion. The ITA now has 57 signatories. Computer software is 
included in the ITA. To ensure that only computer software, and not recorded movies or music, are 
accorded duty-free treatment, most ITA signatories use a strict definition of computer software, 
developed by the World Customs Organisation, in their tariff schedules. Software imports are duty-free 
in many countries but VAT and other taxes are often applied. 
 Basic Telecommunications Agreement: After the conclusion of the Uruguay Round in 1994, some 
member states felt that not enough progress had been made in the area of telecommunications services. 
After three years of extended negotiation on market access for basic telecommunications services,14 69 
                                                 
13 For instance, GATS Article XIX specifically provides that developing countries may attach conditions to their market 
opening commitments regarding the transfer of technology in order to increase their participation in services trade. 
14 Telecommunications services can be divided into two categories: basic telecommunications, which is the simple relay 
of voice or data from sender to receiver; and value-added services, which add a value to the customer’s information. 
Examples of the former are voice telephone services, facsimile services, telegraph services, and packet- or circuit-
switched data transmission services. Value-added services are telecommunications for which suppliers “add value” 
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governments committed to schedules, which were annexed to the GATS. The markets of the 
participants accounted for more than 91 percent of global telecommunications revenues in 1995.  
 1998 moratorium on e-commerce: A final piece of international regulation with bearing on the present 
project is the WTO moratorium from 1998 on not charging customs duties on electronic transmissions. 
A statement in the Ministerial Declaration adopted by WTO members at Doha in November 2001 
declares that members shall maintain the current practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic 
transmissions. Calculations indicate that the economic loss resulting from this exemption is negligible 
(UNCTAD 2001b; UNCTAD 2000; Mattoo et al. 1999). 
 Other related regulations are the international accounting rate system (ITU) and various 
international and domestic standards. 
 
Conclusions 
We put forth a set of four hypotheses pertaining the role of services in general and to functional and 
geographical outsourcing of knowledge and information intensive activities in specific. The increasing 
importance of knowledge and information intensive activities, as well as the organisational trend 
towards outsourcing, was reflected in the fact that services constitute an increasing share of the 
economy in both developed and developing countries.  
 In terms of internationalisation of services, among the most interesting trends were that FDI inward 
stocks grew much faster in developing countries than in developed ones. What outward FDI is 
concerned, throughout the period 1985-2001, outward FDI in services from OECD countries have 
constituted a greater share of total FDI than FDI in manufacturing. Furthermore, there has been a 
pronounced increase in the share of services and FDI in services has accelerated in the latter half of the 
1990s.  We saw that for the OECD countries as a group the hypothesis that the surplus in service trade 
in royalties and fees would increase over the period was not confirmed by the data presented here.  
 A trend towards increasing service internationalisation was clearly visible but so far 
internationalisation predominantly takes the form of FDI rather than trade in services or sales of 
patents or licenses. 
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